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Abstract
Banalieva and Dhanaraj argue that digital service multinationals (DSMNCs)
possess a new category of firm-specific advantage (FSA), the network
advantage, and that, contrary to extant theory, they use networks as a mode
of governance. I review the business models used by DSMNCs, compare them
to non-digital ones, and explore what we can learn about them from extant IB
theory. I conclude that network advantages are not a new category of FSAs,
that networks are not a mode of governance, and that their use by DSMNCs is
well explained by extant theory.
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INTRODUCTION
Banalieva and Dhanaraj address the important and interesting issue
of ‘‘how digitalization alters internationalization theory’s assump-
tions about the nature of firm-specific advantages [FSAs] and
predictions about their governance in cross-border transactions’’
(page 2). Focusing on digitalized service multinational corporations
(DSMNCs), such as Uber, Airbnb, Netflix, Google, and Amazon, they
argue that (1) the internationalization of DSMNCs is driven by
technology and human capital (see their Figure 1); (2) in contrast to
traditional internalization theory, which predicts that ‘‘hierarchy
would be the most efficient governance to protect core technology
FSAs… [while] peripheral technology FSAs can be outsourced…’’
(page 16), DSMNCs govern the exploitation of their technology-
based FSAs not through hierarchy or the market, but instead through
networks, which they argue are a third governance structure
alongside market and hierarchy; (3) digitalization, because it allows
for the capture of strong network effects, results in a new type of FSA/
ownership advantage, the network-based ownership advantage (On).
To evaluate these claims, I propose to revisit what extant IB
theory has said about non-digitalized firms. The goal is to get a
better feel for what is truly new with DSMNCs. A first step is to
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better understand their business models. Since
Banalieva and Dhanaraj want to re-assess internal-
ization theory and FSAs, I propose to review these
two concepts. I argue that while they are useful,
they do not provide a general theory of the
existence and extent of a firm’s foreign footprint.
Furthermore, foreign footprint and foreign sales are
two different things. Banalieva and Dhanaraj stress
the importance of networks in digitalized business,
both as a new type of FSA and as its favored
governance structure (see their Figure 1). In fact,
network advantages (network externalities) are
similar to economies of scale, which have been
extensively discussed in the global strategy litera-
ture, and the findings of this literature are applica-
ble to DSMNCs. Banalieva and Dhanaraj also see
networks as the dominant governance mode for
DSMNCs, supplanting markets and hierarchy. I will
show that networks are not a third governance
structure and not always the best strategy, and that
Banalieva and Dhanaraj’s Figure 1 overestimates
the role of technology and human capital as drivers
of the internationalization of service firms while
ignoring that of reputation.
TYPES OF DIGITALIZED BUSINESS
Let us look first at the types of digitalized business
discussed by Banalieva and Dhanaraj. Table 1 is a
rough and ready categorization of DSMNCs. In the
first column I note whether the business model
involves businesses (B), consumers (C), or both. The
next column describes what is being transacted.
The third one lists the fundamental function of the
digitized business, and that of its sponsor (the firm
that has set up and operates the business). Columns
5 and 6 provide examples of non-digitized and
digitized businesses in each category.
In row 1, I place the many firms which seek to put
individuals in contact with each other so they can,
for instance, share information (Facebook), buy and
sell surplus items (eBay, Taobao), rent unused hous-
ing space (Airbnb), share rides (BlaBlaCar), and enter
into short- or long-term relationships (Tinder, ehar-
mony, Lumen). I call them C2C markets (brokerages)
because they function like markets. Their non-
digitalized counterparts are flea markets, tourist
offices, bulletin boards, marriage bureaus, night-
clubs, etc. Both digital and non-digital brokerages
reduce search costs by providing a location where
information can be shared and/or by setting up a
broker who has connections to actors on both sides
of the transaction. In digitalized businesses, that
location is the website and the broker is the algo-
rithm. In both types of businesses, the value of the
brokerage depends on the number and quality of the
connections on both sides. Similarly, C2B broker-
ages put individuals in contact with businesses
(examples are job-seeking sites like Indeed.com)
and B2B brokerages link small businesses with other
small businesses (e.g., Alibaba.com). B2C brokerages
(e.g., Booking.com, Expedia) allow businesses to sell
goods and services to the public. An important
distinction between this category and the next
category I call ‘‘franchise’’ is that brokers do not set
prices and do not regulate access.1
I call digitized businesses in row five ‘‘franchises’’.
In contrast to brokerages, service providers in
franchises share in the reputation of the platform
through their access to the platform trademark. To
avoid damage to their reputation, sponsors regulate
access and try to control the behavior of service
suppliers. Uber, for example, restricts access to its
app to drivers who meet its requirements – no
serious driving violations, no criminal record, a safe
and presentable car. Uber and Lyft suggest to
Figure 1 Choice between market and hierarchy
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drivers how they should behave, and cut them from
the app if they behave otherwise.2 Uber and Lyft set
prices. The business model of these taxi platforms is
thus similar to McDonalds and other fast-food
franchisors who use independent service providers
but subject them to a significant degree of behavior
control. In contrast to eBay and other C2C plat-
forms, with episodic use by customers on either
side, franchises involve more permanent connec-
tions on the service provider side (which is why
some public authorities insist Uber and Lyft drivers
are in fact employees).3
A third category of websites carries out what is
fundamentally retailing or distribution. Amazon,
Netflix, and Spotify, for instance, resell to con-
sumers goods and services they have bought from
others. Lastly, some producers of goods and services
have integrated forward into distribution and use
electronic platforms to sell their own products. This
is the case of airline and railroad-owned websites,
our fourth category. In short, our quick overview
shows that digitalized businesses are not a homo-
geneous group and so to understand their logic we
must take this into account.
INTERNALIZATION THEORY AND
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF DIGITALIZED
FIRMS
Internalization and Transaction Cost Theories
Does digitalization, as Banalieva and Dhanaraj
claim, affect the assumptions made by
internalization theory about the nature of FSAs
and the predictions about their cross-country gov-
ernance? FSAs are a core construct of internaliza-
tion theory (Narula, 2010, 2014; Verbeke, 2009)
and of Dunning’s OLI paradigm (e.g., Dunning &
Lundan, 2008), but how useful are they in ex-
plaining a firm’s foreign footprint and foreign
sales?
As Banalieva and Dhanaraj rightly point out,
internalization and transaction costs theories seek
to explain why some firms undertake value-adding
activities abroad. In other words, they aim to
predict a firm’s foreign footprint. Early proponents
of internalization theory argued that to be able to
compete with local firms, foreign investors must
have some firm-specific advantages (FSAs) over
them.4 Dunning called them ownership advantages
and saw them as consisting of intangibles, such as
superior products and processes or valuable trade
names. These advantages must be proprietary to the
MNE – they must be firm-specific – otherwise they
would be freely available to their local competitors,
and MNEs would be at a disadvantage, since they
usually incur higher costs of doing business outside
their own country than local firms (Hymer, 1976;
Hennart, 1982; Zaheer, 1995). But having FSAs is
not sufficient to have a foreign footprint, as a firm
with FSAs could incorporate these advantages in
products which it could sell from its home base,
i.e., it could serve foreign markets through exports.
A second condition is therefore that production in
a foreign country must be preferable to exports. In
Table 1 Types of digitalized service firms
Business
model
Transactions Functions
like…
Sponsor
role
Examples of non-digitized
counterparts
Examples of digitized
platforms
C2C Surplus goods; Relationships;
Private accommodations
Markets Broker Flea markets; Marriage bureaus;
Real estate brokers
eBay
Taobao
eharmony
C2B Jobs Markets Broker Government job centers;
University placement centers
Job seeking sites
(e.g., Indeed.com)
B2B Goods and services Markets Broker Brokers Alibaba.com
B2C Hotel rooms; Transportation Markets Broker Tourist offices; Travel agents Booking.com
Expedia
B2C Taxi services; Hotel services Franchises Franchisor Fast food; Hotel chains Uber
Lyft
Ola
B2C Films, music Independent
stores
Retailer Brick and mortar stores Netflix
Spotify
Amazon
B2C Travel Captive
stores
Retailer Airline/railroad offices and ticket
counters
Airline and railroad
own websites
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other words, the target country must have location
advantages (for example abundant natural
resources or cheap labor) that justify producing
abroad. Lastly, a firm must find it more profitable to
have employees exploiting abroad its advantages
rather than renting or selling them to independent
local firms – in which case the firm would not have
a foreign footprint. Hence the third condition is
that internalization is the most profitable way to
exploit FSAs. This occurs when the market for FSAs
is imperfect, and hence their internal transfer is
more efficient than their transfer to local firms by
market processes.
OLI theory makes intuitive sense, and is eminently
testable. Researchers (e.g., Davidson & McFetridge,
1985; Hennart & Park, 1994) have found that firms
will undertake value-adding activities abroad with
their employees if they own valuable firm-specific
intangibles which cannot be licensed or franchised,
but must instead be incorporated in products man-
ufactured close to the foreign customers – for exam-
ple because exports would face high transportation
costs and trade barriers.
While OLI explains well the foreign direct invest-
ments (FDIs) of firms exploiting intangibles, it has
problems accounting for other types of FDIs (Hen-
nart, 1991; Asmussen & Foss, 2014). Firms making
backward vertical investments in mineral resources,
for example, do not do so to exploit their techno-
logical advantages or reputation, but instead to
avoid potential holdup problems caused by small-
number conditions (Stuckey, 1983; Hennart,
1988).5 Likewise, vertical forward integration, say
by manufacturers into distribution, is not under-
taken because manufacturers want to exploit their
FSAs at the distribution stage – their FSAs are at the
manufacturing stage – but in part because they fear
being held up by distributors (Hennart, 2010). A
third type of foreign investments undertaken in the
absence of FSAs are those made to acquire FSAs, for
example the acquisitions of foreign firms to obtain
their intangibles. Then, by definition, the goal of
the investment is not to exploit FSAs but to acquire
them (Hennart, 2012; Asmussen & Foss, 2014).
To handle these types of FDIs not fitting his
original model, Dunning added a new type of FSA/
ownership advantage (Ot), which he called ‘‘advan-
tages of common governance’’ and which ‘‘arise
because of multinationality’’. Narula (2014, 2017)
sees these Ot advantages as consisting of a firm’s
ability to coordinate intra-firm activities and to
combine its FSAs with assets owned by external
actors (see also Narula, Asmussen, Chi & Kundu,
2019). To the extent that these advantages derive
from having successfully internalized the transac-
tion, this is tautological, because this category of
FSA can only be observed ex post. In other words,
the theory predicts that a firm has internalized
because it has Ot advantages, and it tells us we
know it has Ot advantages because it has internal-
ized. This is circular. For OLI to be testable, it must
be able to predict internalization ex ante, not ex
post. One can test whether the level of a firm’s Oa
advantages (measured, for example, through its
patent stock) affects its FDIs. But it would seem that
there is no way to measure a firm’s Ot advantages
except ex post, after the firm has internalized
them.6 For this reason, it is my view that the
explanatory power of OLI is limited to the case of
FDIs made to exploit intangibles.
The transaction cost theory of the MNE (Hennart,
1982, 1991, 2010, 2015b), on the other hand, can
account for all investment types. That theory can
also throw light on the concept of network, which
plays a major role in Banalieva and Dhanaraj’s
argument. Consider my Figure 1. Assume that there
are two agents, A and B, located in two different
countries, 1 and 2, and interdependences between
them that can be potentially organized at a profit
(for example, A has developed a technology that
could be used in country 2, but that needs the local
manufacturing facilities controlled by B to reach
customers). There are four ways to organize this
interdependence: (1) A can contract with B to
license the technology in 2; (2) B can contract with
A to obtain a license for the technology; (3) A can
hire B as her employee and ask her to set up a
manufacturing plant in 2; (4) or B can employ A to
implement the transfer of technology to 2. In cases
(1) and (2), the interdependence is organized
through the market; in cases (3) and (4) within a
firm, in this case an international firm. The ques-
tion then becomes when and why it might be more
profitable to organize an interdependence of that
type within an international firm than across an
international market.
The answer is that, for a given transaction, there
are differences in profitability between coordina-
tion by international markets (the bottom line
joining A and B) and coordination within interna-
tional firms using employment contracts (the top
line joining A and B) because the main organizing
method used in firms (hierarchy) differs from that
used in markets (the price system).7
Hierarchy, as an organizing method, works by
controlling agent behavior through employment
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contracts, while markets do it through the
exchange of output. Each organizing method has
a comparative advantage in organizing a particular
type of interdependence. Consequently, the profits
that can be obtained from organizing that interde-
pendence will be maximized if the right type of
organizing method is chosen. Whenever hierarchi-
cal coordination yields higher profits than coordi-
nation through the market, and organizing the
interdependence generates net gains, the interde-
pendence will be organized within a firm (Hennart,
1982, 1991, 2010, 2015b).8
As I show in Hennart (2015b), this argument can
be generalized to all types of interdependencies,
and hence can explain all types of FDIs. In contrast
to OLI, which shows why interdependencies
involving hard-to-market knowledge will lead to
the exploitation of that knowledge by its creator
through FDI, my theory also explains why the
buyers of such knowledge will acquire it through
FDI. The same reasons which push A to make B her
employee – the inefficiency of the market for
technology – also explain why B may want to
employ A. Hence, the theory explains both asset-
seeking and asset-exploiting FDIs. An important
implication of this approach is that the rationale
for internalization is not only the safeguarding of
FSAs by intangible-exploiting firms, but more gen-
erally the greater profits that can sometimes be
achieved by organizing interdependencies through
control of behavior than through exchange of
outputs. This explains why the possession of FSAs
is not a necessary condition for FDI. It also allows
us to explain the governance choices of some
digitalized businesses.
An important difference between my approach
and standard internalization theory is that my unit
of analysis is the interdependency, not the firm.
Firms have to deal with many interdependencies,
each with its particular characteristics. Some will be
more profitably organized within a firm, and some
on a market. The size of a firm’s foreign footprint is
the result of how all international interdependen-
cies facing the firm are organized.
Note also that market failure is not a necessary
condition for the emergence of MNEs. Even if
organizing an interdependence within an MNE is
more profitable than doing it on the market, the
benefits of doing so must be higher than the costs.
In fact, in some cases, both firm and market
coordination will fail. Take the transfer of knowl-
edge during the British industrial revolution. Dur-
ing that period, British firms enjoyed a clear
technological advantage over the rest of the world,
an advantage similar to that enjoyed by US firms
after WW2. At that time, the market for intellectual
property was very inefficient, thus justifying the
exploitation of knowledge through FDI. Yet this did
not happen. Instead, technology was mostly trans-
ferred through the emigration of skilled British
workers and entrepreneurs, Cockerill for example.
One can speculate that this was due to the lack of
effective managerial techniques to control foreign
subsidiaries (Hennart, 1982: 122–130). So clearly
managerial competences matter. Some firms are
better than others at organizing internal or external
transactions. This will affect the probability they
will choose to organize the interdependence inter-
nally or externally.
Reputation, embedded in trademarks, can be
exploited through outlets operated by independent
contractors or through ones manned by employees
of the trademark owner. Unless consumers are
recurrent and trademark owners can cheaply mon-
itor quality, independent contractors, whose
rewards depend on their marketable output, can
be expected to increase their profits by reducing the
cost of producing output, and hence its quality –
for example fast-food franchisees may leave the
French fries too long under the heat lamp rather
than fry a new batch (Brickley & Dark, 1987). This
problem is less prevalent if the outlet is manned by
employees, because they do not directly benefit
from the outlet’s profitability, and hence are more
willing to behave in ways that maintain quality. On
the other hand, the lack of direct link between their
efforts and their rewards means that employees
have less incentive to exert effort: they can be
expected to shirk. There is therefore a tradeoff
between the cost of monitoring employee behavior
to avoid shirking and that of controlling quality to
avoid free-riding by operators (cheating).9
In 1955, when McDonalds started to sell fast
food, most trademark owners sold the right to
franchise outlets to master franchisees, who in turn
sublicensed outlets. Franchisors did not take strong
measures to control quality free-riding because, in
order to attract master franchises, they gave them
substantial autonomy, which resulted in low and
uneven quality. Franchisors also earned most of
their income from the sale of supplies and equip-
ment to outlets, so they were loath to discontinue
poorly performing franchises. Ray Kroc, McDon-
alds’ founder, realized that consistent quality was
crucial to the long-term success of a fast-food chain.
He chose to directly franchise outlets one-by-one to
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individual franchisees, made them sign detailed
contracts with strict quality guidelines, provided
them with training, and set up a system of unan-
nounced quality inspections. Payments to McDon-
alds were not in the form of mark-ups on supplies
and equipment, but rather through royalties,
which aligned better the interests of franchisor
and franchisee. While the franchising practices of
its competitors led to systematic quality free-riding
by franchisees, and eventually to the demise of
their franchise chains, Kroc was able to control this
main disadvantage without having to operate out-
lets with employees, which, while it would have
achieved more consistent quality, would have also
led to high management costs (Hennart, 1994).
While it may be tempting, following Narula
(2014), Gaur, Patnaik, Lee and Singh (2019), and
Narula et al. (2019) to call an ability to more
efficiently organize interdependencies internally
and externally an ownership advantage, this should
be resisted for a number of reasons. First, treating
these capabilities as ownership advantages results
in tautological predictions. Seeing that McDonalds
had successfully externalized local fast-food pro-
duction, Narula et al. (2019) would explain this by
McDonalds’ external transactional FSA (a superior
ability to externalize transactions, or an Ote). The
problem is that this is not falsifiable since we only
know ex post that McDonalds had this advantage.
Instead, one should develop a theory of what
affects the choice between market and hierarchical
governance (i.e., between output incentives and
behavior control), identify McDonalds’ practices,
and, based on the theory, hypothesize how these
practices should affect that choice. One can then
ascertain whether the predicted effects are actually
observed.
In our McDonalds case, transaction cost theory
clearly indicates the factors that will lead a trade-
mark owner to choose between using organiza-
tional methods heavy on output constraints (loose
franchises) versus those heavy on behavior con-
straints (operating outlets with employees). It pre-
dicts that an organizational method that makes it
possible to reduce free-riding by franchises without
harming their work effort will be more prof-
itable than running the chain with employees. By
first understanding the generic dilemma faced by
firms which want to exploit a trademark, we are
able to predict ex ante how Kroc’s innovation of
unit-by-unit franchising under strong quality-con-
trol guidelines will affect the parameters of this
dilemma. Likewise, we can extend our analysis to
other contexts, and predict that any technology or
system that improves the ability of trademark
owners to quickly detect quality lapses by fran-
chisees and to sanction them at low cost will tend
to tilt their choice towards the franchising option
and away from using employees. The universal
reliance on independent drivers by electronic taxi
platforms like Uber, Lyft, and Didi can thus be
explained by technological advances that reduce
the cost to trademark owners of monitoring service
quality and of expelling poorly performing drivers.
While fast-food franchisors need to make unan-
nounced inspections and, if these clearly show free-
riding on quality, initiate legal processes to be able
to physically remove signs from the restaurants or
expel franchisees from the premises they own, taxi
platforms can monitor quality through electronic
customer feedback and expel deviant drivers by
cutting their access to the app. Everything else
constant, such advances favor the use of indepen-
dent contractors over employees, and hence lead
taxi platform firms to have a smaller foreign
footprint.10 So rather than treating a firm’s capacity
to handle internal and external transactions as a
black-box ownership advantage (Oti and Ote), I
believe it makes more sense to see them as shift
parameters that, ceteris paribus, alter a firm’s choice
of governance mode for a specific interdependence.
The second problem with treating a firm’s ability
to devise a more effective governance structure as
an FSA is that it affects the coherence of the OLI
model. While in the OLI model higher ownership
advantages (given a high value for internalization
advantages) lead to a larger foreign footprint, a
higher value of Ote advantages, on the other hand,
will, as we have seen above, lead to a smaller one.
This is confusing. In the original OLI model, Oa
advantages lead to a bigger footprint only in the
presence of internalization advantages. But what
happens when the firm has Ote advantages? Are
these ‘‘negative’’ internalization advantages? Fur-
thermore, and along with Narula (2010), I think
that adding countless varieties of O advantages to
the OLI model runs the risk of exceeding its
carrying capacity. How many blades can one add
to a Swiss Army knife before it loses its purpose?
I do not have the space here for a detailed
explanation of why organizing an interdependence
using hierarchical processes can, in some cases, be
more efficient than doing it through the exchange
of outputs (see Hennart, 1982, 1986, 1993). An
important point, though, is that coordination
through control of behavior and coordination
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through exchange of outputs are the only two
organizing methods available. But because each
method has both advantages and defects, it usually
makes sense to combine them in institutions
(Hennart, 1993). Agents rewarded by the sale of
output are motivated to maximize it, at the expense
of output dimensions difficult to measure (a behav-
ior called cheating, of which free-riding is a type).
Inversely, agents rewarded on the basis of their
behavior can take advantage of imperfect monitor-
ing of their behavior to work less hard than they
promised, i.e., they may be able to shirk. If one
makes the reasonable assumption that there are
diminishing returns to the exclusive use of either
type of organizing method, then it makes sense to
combine them in what I have called hybrids
(Hennart, 1993, 2013).
To go back to our fast-food example, trademark
owners rent their trademarks to independent
entrepreneurs, while attempting to constrain their
behavior through franchise contracts. These con-
tracts specify rules of behavior that maintain qual-
ity (the QSC guidelines) that franchisees must
follow to maintain their franchises. Franchise con-
tracts are external hybrids because they use princi-
pally output-based incentives – franchisees get to
keep most of what they make – but with some
quality-preserving hierarchical constraints – the
QSC contractual clauses (Hennart, 1993).11
Powell (1990), cited by Banalieva and Dhanaraj
to support their argument, has advanced that the
network is a third organizing method, ‘‘neither a
market transaction nor a hierarchical governance
structure, but a separate, different mode of
exchange, one with its own logic’’. He contrasts
networks with market transactions where ‘‘the
benefits to be exchanged are clearly specified, no
trust is required, and agreements are bolstered by
the power of legal sanctions’’. In contrast, he argues
that ‘‘network forms of exchange… entail indefi-
nite, sequential transactions within the context of a
general pattern of interaction. Sanctions are typi-
cally normative rather than legal’’ (Powell, 1990:
301). As examples of networks he cites the web of
subcontractors in the construction, publishing, and
film industries.
Two points need to be made here. First, Powell’s
definition of market transactions is a bit of a
caricature. Not all market transactions fit his
description. Some are recurring, undertaken
between parties with a close relationships to each
other, guided by social norms rather than written
contracts, and enforced through reciprocity or the
threat to reputation within a tight social group
(Hennart, 2015a; Strange & Humphrey, 2019).
These transactions are market transactions, because
parties organize their interdependence through the
exchange of outputs, are mostly driven by output
incentives, and belong to separate organizations.
These criteria – coordination through exchange of
outputs between agents who are rewarded by their
output at market prices – define market exchange
both in theory and law.
Second, the term ‘‘network’’ has been used to
describe the structure of a value chain, but also its
governance. The two are very different phenom-
ena. The number of firms at one stage of a value
chain is sometimes much larger than at the
preceding or subsequent stage. This results in a
very large number of firms buying from, or selling
to, a few firms or even a single firm. This large
number of firms is sometimes called a network
(Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997). For example, one
hundred billions of Visa credit card transactions
were processed in 2014 in four large data centers
located throughout the world on behalf of a
handful of credit card brands (e.g., Visa, Master-
Card, American Express, JCB, CUP). The signing up
of customers, however, is done by a large number –
a network – of local banks (Wikipedia, 2019). Like
all structural networks, the credit card network has
arisen because of large differences in minimum
efficient scale (MES) between adjacent stages in a
value chain. Similarly, brokerages, for instance
trading companies, exist because, given the high
MES of information collection and processing, it
makes sense for buyers and sellers to subcontract
this task to a broker. The MES at the upstream stage
of fast food – brand building and menu develop-
ment – is typically larger than that of local food
preparation, hence the need for a network of small
local outlets, either manned by employees of the
trademark-owner, forming an internal network, or
by franchisees – an external network. In short,
structural networks are configurations, not gover-
nance structures. They can be governed by pure
hierarchy, by internal hybrids made up of hierarchy
plus some market processes, as in the internal
network of diversified firms and MNEs (Bartlett &
Ghoshal, 1990; Rugman & Verbeke, 2003), by
external hybrids, which are mostly market but
incorporate some hierarchical constraints, as in the
case of franchising networks, and by pure market
processes, as in the case of markets, electronic or
otherwise (Hennart, 2013). Structural networks
governed by hierarchy and internal hybrids are
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inside the firm, while those that make use of
external hybrids and markets are market transac-
tions. There is no third generic organizing method.
International Footprint Versus International Sales
Parallel to the development of theories explaining
the existence and size of a firm’s foreign footprint,
scholars have been interested in explaining the
volume of a firm’s foreign sales. The two are not the
same, since a firm can have extensive foreign sales
but zero foreign footprint if it exports all of its
production through independent distributors or,
alternatively, a very large foreign footprint but no
foreign sales if, for example, it mines abroad to
procure ores for domestic customers.
There are two fundamental reasons why firms
located in one country can profitably sell in
another country. The first one is arbitrage, the
exploitation of differences between markets sepa-
rated by distance – differences in input costs (labor,
capital, raw materials), but also in tastes, culture,
and institutions (Ghemawat, 2007). The second is
replication. This strategy, which consists of
expanding the domestic sales of a product to
foreign markets, makes sense when the optimal
scale of production is greater than that supported
by the domestic market. This is the case when
production processes incur high fixed costs. Then
average production costs will decline until MES is
reached. If MES is larger than that required to serve
domestic customers, the firm will benefit from
selling abroad. This strategy is feasible if (1) trans-
portation costs and barriers to exports are low; (2)
consumer tastes are homogeneous; (3) the risks of
concentrating production in a few locations are
tolerable.
Economies of scale exist at the plant level (they
lead to exports) and at the firm level. Firm-level
economies of scale arise from the presence of fixed
costs in generating intangibles. For example,
research and development (R&D) expenditures
undertaken to develop a new product or process
are fixed costs, which the firm can recoup by selling
goods incorporating the new design or process. If
the domestic market is too small, the firm will sell
abroad. The same argument applies to the building
up of reputation through consistent quality, supe-
rior service, guarantees, and/or advertising, since,
as in the case of innovations, the fixed costs of
building a reputation can only be recouped with a
sufficient level of sales.
The major difference between plant- and firm-
level economies of scale is that the former require
production in a single plant while the latter are
compatible with multi-plant operations. Plant-level
scale economies are therefore limited by the
increase in transportation costs that accompanies
the increased concentration of production. By
contrast, firm-level economies of scale can be
exploited through multiple plants because knowl-
edge and reputation can be cheaply and simulta-
neously transferred to them. When reaching MES
requires a volume of production larger than the
domestic market, the firm will sell abroad. If that
market is a niche market, the number of domestic
customers may be small, and the firm will have to
sell abroad almost immediately after birth (Hen-
nart, 2014).
So global strategies consist of selling the same
product the same way in all countries. This has a
number of limitations. The international exploita-
tion of plant-level scale economies is constrained
by transportation costs, and that of both plant- and
firm-level scale economies by customer heterogene-
ity. Some of this heterogeneity is location-based,
when where customers live affects their tastes and
their ability to use the product as is. Even if there is
no need to make product adaptations on a geo-
graphical basis, some fraction of the customer base
may have needs and interests that are poorly served
by a one-size-fits-all product or service offering, and
will prefer better-adapted products. These consid-
erations need to be kept in mind when ascertaining
the strengths and limitations of DSMNCs.
Internationalization of Service Firms
What are the drivers of the internalization of
service firms? It is generally recognized that con-
sumers face greater uncertainty in assessing the
quality of services than that of goods because
service quality can only be ascertained ex post,
i.e., by consuming it. Firms invest in reputation
(through branding) to reduce that uncertainty.
Consequently, scholars have found that the inter-
national transfer of reputation is an important
driver of the internationalization of service firms.
Residents of one country who find themselves
temporarily or permanently in another have diffi-
culty assessing the quality and reliability of local
service providers, and hence are likely to patronize
home-country firms that they know and trust.
Catering to home-country consumers can give
home-country service firms expanding abroad a
foothold that allows them to expand to local
customers. There is extensive evidence to support
this view (e.g., Jones, 1996), for example in the case
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of banks (e.g., Focarelli & Pozzolo, 2001; Tschoegl,
2005; Galamhussen, Hennart & Pinheiro, 2016).
COMMENTS ON BANALIEVA AND DHANARAJ’S
ARGUMENTS
Sources of Advantages for Digital Service MNEs
We now are in a position to assess the arguments
made by Banalieva and Dhanaraj. We start with the
authors’ Figure 1. It shows the governance mode
chosen by digital SMNCs to exploit two types of
FSAs abroad, those based on human capital, and
those based on technology. First, it is not obvious
how human-based FSAs differ from technology-
based ones. Banalieva and Dhanaraj cite Uber in the
section discussing the exploitation of human-based
FSAs, but it is unclear how Uber can be described as
exploiting human-based FSAs and not technology-
based ones, except insofar as its technological
advantages are developed by its programmers. It is
also not obvious that the technology (i.e., the
software) of digital service MNEs is a crucial com-
petitive tool for DSMNCs.
A casual look at the evidence shows that while
technology may be necessary for DSMNCs to gain
initial market share, it is not sufficient to maintain
it. Digital business models appear to be routinely
copied by competitors – Taobao replicated eBay and
eventually drove it out of China and so did Didi
Chuxing with Uber (Solomon, 2016). Bol in Hol-
land, and FNAC in France, successfully compete
with Amazon. Missing here, in my view, is the role
played by home-country reputation.
Networks As FSAs
Banalieva and Dhanaraj suggest adding network
advantages (On) to the traditional asset-based (Oa)
and transaction-based (Ot) advantages. As we have
seen, ownership advantages (FSAs) must be specific
to a firm. To avoid tautology, they must also be
observable ex ante. Network advantages (also called
network externalities) do not seem to fulfill these
two conditions. They arise when the attractiveness
of a product and service to a new user depends on
the number of existing users. For example, the
larger the number of buyers and sellers on a C2C
brokerage site such as eBay, the more attractive the
platform. Network externalities are not only found
in electronic platforms, but in other businesses as
well, for example credit cards, where the attractive-
ness of the card to potential users depends on how
many sellers will accept it, and to sellers on how
many buyers will carry it. If there are network
externalities, the firm that is the first to gain market
share may have a first mover advantage over
followers similar to that gained through scale
economies in R&D or reputation.
So, should network advantages be added to the
list of FSAs? Network externalities are not firm
specific, they are a characteristic of the industry, or
perhaps of the business model within an industry.
For instance, any firm that starts a dating site can
potentially benefit from network externalities, but
they are only firm-specific ex post, in the sense that
it is only ex post that we can observe that network
externalities benefit a particular firm.12 Hence they
cannot be antecedents of the foreign footprint or
foreign sales volume of a given firm because
whether or not they will accrue to a specific firm
is not observable ex ante. Paradoxically, while the
possession of asset-based (Oa) and internalization-
based (Ot) advantages leads to a greater footprint
(given positive values for L and I advantages), a
firm’s endowment of On advantages may lead to a
smaller one, because the larger the optimal size of
the network, the more likely the market can be
served from a single location, and hence the
smaller the firm’s foreign footprint. A firm that
sells a global product to a worldwide customer base
(Google) is likely to have a smaller foreign footprint
than one that must sell locally adapted versions in
each country (Uber, Netflix). How much do
DSMNCs benefit from network externalities?13 As
with plant-level scale economies, network exter-
nalities are limited by transportation costs. In
contrast to communication software like What-
sApp, which can be used worldwide with little
adaptation, having the largest network of cus-
tomers and drivers in a given location, say Boston,
does not give Uber an advantage in Bombay,
because customers in Bombay cannot use a Boston
driver.14 If Uber wants to enter Bombay, it will have
to build its network there from scratch, putting it at
a disadvantage relative to local players if its
software is relatively easy to imitate by locals but
its business model needs local adaptation, which is
apparently the case. Network externalities are also
limited by the same factors that limit the exploita-
tion of firm-level scale economies. First, the firm’s
FSA may be location-bound because the business
model is home-country specific (Rugman & Ver-
beke, 1992). Google, for example, which dominates
the global search market with an 80% plus market
share, has failed to penetrate Korea, where a
Korean-designed search engine, Naver, has 70% of
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the market. One of the reasons is syntax differences
between Korean and English, another is subtle
preferences in screen layout (Krush, nd).15 Differ-
ences in the availability of complementary inputs is
another limitation (Hennart, 2009). Uber’s business
model is based in part on moonlighting car owners
and a credit-card-based payment system. This poses
problems in countries where potential drivers do
not own cars and most customers and drivers do
not have bank accounts, let alone credit cards
(Karnik, 2017). Differences between home- and
host-country regulations make the international
transfer of some digital business models difficult
and sometimes impossible (Pollman & Barry, 2017).
Lastly, although some digitalized business models
do not require geographically based adaptation,
heterogeneity within a global consumer group
makes it possible for rivals to challenge incumbents
by focusing on user groups poorly served by a one-
size-fits-all offering (Suarez & Kirtley, 2012).
Network externalities benefit first movers, but as
the first mover literature tells us (Lieberman &
Montgomery, 1988), network externalities generate
first-mover advantages only if there are high
switching costs. At first sight, switching costs in
digitalized business appear to be quite low. Yahoo,
which was at some time the dominant search
engine, was quickly displaced by Google, and so
was MySpace by Facebook. Neither users nor dri-
vers do not seem to have difficulty switching
between Uber and Lyft, or between Uber and its
Indian competitor Ola (Rideshareapp, 2019). The
same goes for most e-commerce platforms.
Networks As Governance Structures
As we have seen, the term ‘‘network’’ has been used
to refer to a structural element in a value chain or
to a type of governance that is alleged to differ from
market and hierarchy. As a structural element,
networks arise from differences in MES across stages
– as per our earlier credit card example. Digital
platforms have often a larger MES than apps and
local production units. This results in a pattern of
many small developers contributing apps to a
platform or many local producers using the plat-
form. There is nothing particular with DSMNCs in
that regard. Note, however, that this network
structure does not apply to many of the business
models listed in Table 1, unless the term network
also applies to individuals making relatively infre-
quent transactions.
‘‘Network’’ is also meant to describe a governance
structure that is supposed to be an alternative to
market and hierarchy. Banalieva and Dhanaraj
mention Uber. As we have seen, as many firm
exploiting a global reputation but having to deliver
on the spot services in many locations, Uber has
two choices. It can use its own employees, or it can
contract with independent drivers. As discussed
earlier, it is easier to achieve high quality with
employees because they have fewer incentives to
cut corners, but because a large number of drivers
are required, Uber would experience high monitor-
ing costs and lose in flexibility if it employed them.
Independent drivers who get to keep the bulk of
what they earn have incentives to work hard and to
be flexible, but also to reduce quality: they can be
expected to drive too fast, skip on maintenance,
and overprice. Uber’s software has built-in features
that control for some aspects of likely free-riding –
for example fares are calculated by the software and
imposed on drivers, payment in most countries is
made directly to Uber, drivers are rated by users,
and data are collected on driver ride rejections. It is
much easier for Uber and Lyft to discontinue free
riders than it is for McDonalds and other fran-
chisors, since all that Uber and Lyft have to do is to
cut off driver access to their software (Tomassetti,
2016).16 Other forms of driver free-riding, however,
have proved harder to control. There have been
many instances of accidents caused by careless
driving and even assaults on customers (Atchinson
Transport Co., 2019). Such events have the poten-
tial of putting taxi platforms out of business.
Hence, one condition for the use of franchisees is
that it is possible to control excessive free-riding on
quality. If not, it makes more sense to operate with
employees. This is the case with consulting firms
that can serve the market with fewer outlets and
that would have difficulty contractually specifying
quality levels and catching quality lapses before
they cause problems. Hence ‘‘networks’’ (i.e., exter-
nal hybrids) are not a universal solution. DSMNCs
will choose this governance structure to exploit
their high-technology FSAs when two conditions
are met: (1) the business model is characterized by
differences in MES across stages and (2) it is more
efficient to enlist the initiative of local providers
through franchising-like contract and try to tackle
the resultant quality debasement problems than to
achieve high quality but have to put up with
shirking by employees.
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CONCLUSION
When trying to make sense of supposedly new
phenomena, it is important to identify what is
really new and what is similar to what we already
know. I start by trying to understand what digitized
service MNEs (DSMNCs) do. I find that the term
covers different business models. Then I take a good
look at extant IB theories to see whether they can
throw light on these firms. Internalization and
transaction cost theories, as well as the literature on
the internationalization of service firms, suggest
that technology and human capital may not be the
main drivers of the internationalization of Internet-
enabled service firms, that the network configura-
tion is not specific to these firms, that the impor-
tance of network externalities may be overstated,
and that using the network form of governance
(i.e., external hybrids) for local service delivery is
only optimal in specific circumstances.
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NOTES
1Note that the distinction between C2C and B2C
brokerages is not always sharp. Airbnb is said to be
now dominated by multi-unit renters, while eBay
admits both businesses and individuals on its
website.
2Uber tracks drivers’ acceptance to take offered
rides and their customer ratings, with drivers that
rate below 4.6/5 discontinued (Rosenblatt, 2016;
Tomassetti, 2016).
3While Uber employs many drivers who work
part time, Zatz (2016) estimates that full-time
drivers (those driving more than 35 hours per
week) account for 44% of total rides. The Paris
Uber drivers interviewed by Wentrup, Nakamura,
and Stro¨m (2018) reported that they worked an
average of 65 hours per week.
4Although some still assert this today (e.g.,
Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009), the assumption
that foreign investors must always have a firm-
specific advantage over locals overlooks the
possibility that foreign investors can acquire FSAs,
for example through the acquisition of local firms
(Asmussen & Foss, 2014).
5The absence of a connection between intangi-
ble-based FSAs and backwards vertical integration is
supported by the fact that often the backward
integrating firm lets the management of the
acquired firm continue to manage the mines and
plantations, or in the case of greenfields, uses
outside specialist firms to run them.
6Dunning and Lundan (2008: 101) define Ot
advantages as deriving from the greater ability of
MNEs than firms coordinating their activities
through the market to shift production, to source
globally, to obtain favored access to inputs, to
diversify and to reduce risks. However, it is not clear
why internal organization always procures such
advantages over using international markets (Hen-
nart, 2007).
7Internalization does not consist of replacing
inefficient external markets by more efficient inter-
nal ones. The defining characteristic of a firm is not
the replacement of an inefficient system of external
prices by a more efficient internal one. While firms
make some use of price incentives, in what I have
called internal hybrids, this is not what defines
them, both legally and theoretically. Instead, the
firm is defined by the use of the employment
contract under which agents agree to have a boss
direct their behavior in exchange for a payment
that is not strongly linked to their output (Hennart,
1986, 2013; Masten, 1988).
8The goal is not to minimize transaction costs,
but to maximize the joint net gains from organiz-
ing the interdependence (Hennart, 2015c).
9My definition of shirking and cheating is slightly
different from that of Chi (1994: 279). He defines
shirking as the evasion of a broadly specified
obligation, and cheating as that of a narrowly
specified one. I define shirking as a violation of the
duty of care in an employment contract made
possible by imperfect behavior monitoring, and
cheating as a violation of the terms of output
contracts made possible by imperfect output
measurement.
10Inversely, Baker and Hubbard (2004) document
how the introduction of on-board truck computers
has reduced the ability of in-house drivers to shirk
and has led manufacturers to rely less on external
owner–operators and more on in-house trucking.
11Internal hybrids arise when firms make partial
use of output incentives, as in the case of profit
centers or piecework (Hennart, 2013).
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12It has to do with more conventional FSAs, such
as how good their algorithms are, or perhaps how
carefully their business model has been thought
through.
13I am indebted to Christian Asmussen for his
insights on this topic.
14Beyond the fact that its success in Boston will
make it able to attract Bostonians visiting or
working in Bombay.
15Korean, Japanese, and Chinese users prefer the
busy screens of local search engines to Google’s.
16Uber’s contract with its drivers allows the
company to cut off access for any reason and at
any time (Tomassetti, 2016: 11).
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